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Abstract
Cloud computing is fast becoming a ubiquitous part of today’s
economy for both businesses and individuals. Banks and financial
institutions are no exception. While it has many benefits, cloud
computing also has costs and introduces risks. Significant cloud
providers are single points of failure and, as such, are an important
new source of systemic risk in financial markets. Given this reality,
this article argues that such institutions should be considered critical
infrastructures and designated as systemically important financial
market utilities under Dodd-Frank’s Title VIII.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2019, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (FRBR) examiners paid
a visit to an Amazon facility in Virginia. 1 The Bank Service Company Act
provided them with minimal powers for this call. However, there was no
red-carpet rollout to greet the visitors. Instead, they were chaperoned by
an employee and allowed only a limited, no copies taken, document review.
The examiners were purportedly also unaware at that time that a hacker
had compromised Capital One data – a bank supervised by the FRBR –
stored on Amazon’s cloud. 2 The breach exposed credit card application
information of around 106 million people. 3 Multiple lawsuits related to
the incident have been filed, including against Amazon. 4 “[W]hether they
want to be or not,” cloud service providers “such as Amazon are now
. . . crucial player[s] in the U.S. banking system.” 5
Cloud computing is fast becoming ubiquitous in today’s economy for
businesses and individuals. As highly-regulated entities, banks have been
slower to the party; but, this is changing. 6 For example, Bank of America
(BoA) announced plans “to deliver 80 percent of its technological
functions on virtual platforms and with public cloud infrastructure” in the
near future. 7 A 2016 McKinsey Report noted that nearly 100% of financial

Liz Hoffman, Dana Mattioli & Ryan Tracy, Banks’ Cloud Practices Face Fed’s Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J. (August 2, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-examined-amazonscloud-in-new-scrutiny-for-tech-11564693812, at A1.
2 In 2018, Amazon captured about half of the public cloud market. Id.
3 Nat Levy, Amazon and Capital One Face Legal Backlash After Massive Hack Affects 106M
Customers, GEEKWIRE (Aug. 9, 2019, 12:16 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/2019/
amazon-capital-one-face-lawsuits-massive-hack-affects-106m-customers/.
4 Id.
5 Hoffman, supra note 1, at A1. But see Christina Rexrode & Emily Glazer, Global
Finance: Amazon Cloud Service Is Aimed at Big Banks, Wall ST. J. at A1 (reporting on
Amazon’s courtship of banks for its cloud services) (Feb 23, 2016).
6 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A Financial System That Creates Economic
Opportunities: Nonbank Financials, Fintech, and Innovation (July 2018) [hereinafter Treasury
Report]. But see Deutsche Bank, Regulation Driving Banking Transformation (Oct. 2018),
https://cib.db.com/docs_new/GTB_Digital_Whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter Banking
Transformation] (discussing banks history of private cloud usage).
7 Letter from Katie Porter, Congresswoman, and Nydia M. Velazquez,
Congresswoman, to Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury (Aug. 22, 2019),
(https://velazquez.house.gov/sites/velazquez.house.gov/files/FSOC%20cloud%20.pd
f) (citing Bank of America Chooses the Microsoft Cloud to Support Digital Transformation,
MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (Oct. 2, 2017)), https://news.microsoft.com/2017/
10/02/bank-of-america-chooses-the-microsoft-cloud-to-support-digital-transformation/
[hereinafter Mnuchin Letter].
1
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institutions use some form of cloud computing. 8 Consequently,
multifaceted scrutiny of banks’ use of cloud services is set to accelerate.
Across the globe, banking regulators are increasingly focusing in on
financial market innovations, 9 such as the use of cloud computing, which
presents both known and unknown risks to financial market stability.
Hence, as banks and financial institutions 10 continue their march to the
cloud, the type of supervisory visit described above is simply not going to
cut it.
This article contends that significant cloud service providers are core
infrastructures in financial markets and, therefore, critical financial market
utilities (FMUs). Accordingly, it argues that significant cloud service
providers should be designated by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) 11 as systemically important financial market utilities
(SIFMUs) under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). It expands upon work by the
authors on financial market utilities 12 and by Professor Nizan Geslevich
Packin, arguing that key digital service providers should be designated as
“Critical Service Providers.” 13 Indeed, Congresswomen Katie Porter and
8 Nagendra Bommadevara, Andrea Del Miglio & Steven Jansen, Cloud Adoption to
Accelerate IT Modernization, Digital McKinsey: Insights 12, 14 (Apr. 2018), https://
mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/cloud-adoption-toaccelerate-it-modernization#.
9 See Bank of England, Financial Stability Report 4944-4849 (July 2019),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability-report/2019/july-2019; Alan W.
Avery, Nicola Higgs and Fiona M. Maclean, FSB Concerns Over Cloud Concentration in
Financial Services Continues, GLOBAL FINTECH & PAYMENTS BLOG (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.fintechandpayments.com/2019/10/fsb-concerns-over-cloud-concentrationin-financial-services-continues/#page=1.
10 This article uses the phrase “banks and financial institutions,” and the individual
terms “bank” or “financial institution” almost interchangeably. However, readers
unfamiliar with banking and financial institutions law should realize that while all banks
can be considered financial institutions, not all financial institutions are, from a legal
perspective, banks. Banks are among the most highly regulated institutions, but this is not
necessarily the case for all non-bank financial institutions, some of which are barely
regulated at all.
11 The Financial Stability Oversight Council, established by the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, is a government council of financial
regulators chaired by the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department. See generally DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124
Stat. 1392, 1393 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321).
12 Supra note †.
13 Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0? Digital Service Providers as Cyber-Social
Systems, 93 IND. L.J. 1211 (2018) (arguing that key digital service providers, like the largest
financial institutions, are too big to fail and should be recognized as such).
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Nydia M. Velázquez wrote to U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin
requesting that the FSOC consider Title VIII designations for Amazon
Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, which currently
capture the greatest percentage of the cloud computing market. 14
The FSOC refers to designated FMUs as the “plumbing of the
financial system.” 15 As this article demonstrates, this description aligns
closely with the services cloud firms provide to banks and financial
institutions, specifically, the provision of infrastructure and platform
computing services. As banks accelerate their use of cloud services, the
risk that these technology service providers will pose to financial market
stability will escalate. 16 Similar to the eight existing SIFMUs, 17 significant
cloud service providers are single points of failure and will come to
represent one of the most important systemic risks to global financial
market stability. In fact, SIFMUs such as the Options Clearing
Corporation are themselves increasingly relying on cloud services. 18 This
reality significantly bolsters the argument for designating such cloud
service providers as SIFMUs.
The FRBR examiners’ spring 2019 visit to an Amazon facility arguably
supports this new reality. An appropriate regulatory framework for cloud
service providers is beyond the scope of this article; however, it lays
important groundwork towards this task. It demonstrates that significant
cloud service providers could and should be SIFMUs. This article
proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of cloud computing;
Part II analyzes benefits, costs, and risks associated with banks and
financial institutions’ use of cloud services; Part III examines relevant legal
and regulatory considerations; Part IV argues that cloud service providers
will increasingly constitute a critical risk to financial market stability, and

Mnuchin Letter, supra note 7.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council Makes
First Designations in Effort to Protect Against Future Financial Crises (Jul. 18, 2012) (on
file with author).
16 See Brendan Pedersen, Does Amazon-Google-Microsoft Hold on the Cloud Pose a Risk to
Banking?, AMERICAN BANKER (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/
news/does-amazon-google-microsoft-hold-on-the-cloud-pose-a-risk-to-banking.
17 Designated Financial Market Utilities, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV, https://www.federal
reserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
18 OCC Launches Renaissance Initiative to Modernize Technology Infrastructure, THE
OPTIONS CLEARING CORPORATION, https://www.theocc.com/about/newsroom/
releases/2019/january-14-occ-launches-renaissance-initiative-to-modernize-technologystructure.jsp (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
14
15
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that cloud service providers should be designated as SIFMUs under
Dodd-Frank’s Title VIII; and the conclusion follows.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CLOUD COMPUTING
Cloud computing turns the outdated enterprise data center model on
its head by creating advantages in scale, resource elasticity, organizational
agility, and operational resiliency. No one definition of cloud computing
exists. The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines cloud
computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction.” 19 Cloud resources can be deployed as: public, in
which there is a public sharing of cloud resources; private, in which
specific cloud resources, owned by the user or third-party, are restricted to
one user; community-based, in which resources are shared by select users
and owned by one or more of these users or a third-party; or hybrid, a
combination of approaches.
Three cloud service models also exist to characterize the services
provided by the cloud to the user and vary in terms of the extent of
customer outsourcing and customization ability. They are explained in
Figure 1, and include: Software as a Service, in which customers rely on
the provider for management of applications, computing resources, and
infrastructure; Platform as a Service, in which customers can control
applications, but providers manage computing resources and
infrastructure; and Infrastructure as a Service, in which customers control
“fundamental computing resources” and providers manage the underlying
infrastructure. 20 Banks and financial institutions have used all of the
deployment and service models. 21

19 Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing:
Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special
Publication 800-145 (2011).
20 Id.
21 Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 48.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Cloud Computing Service Models 22

While customers can transfer their data and operations to the cloud,
banks have generally been cautious about migrating critical data and
operations. Instead, banks are taking an incremental approach leading first
with non-core data aspects and operations. However, banks are
increasingly considering “the possibility of migrating core systems from
private to public clouds, signifying a significant leap forward.” 23 Indeed,
some banks, such as Capital One, no longer support their own proprietary
data centers and have instead migrated “much of their digital footprint to
the cloud.” 24 Analysts predict that almost 40% of financial service firms
will process half of their transactions on the cloud by 2020. 25 Within 5-10
years, banks could rely on cloud service providers for “the vast majority
of their computing needs.” 26 Increased migration to the cloud will require
high comfort levels about such arrangements from a regulatory
perspective, particularly in regard to sensitive data and critical functions. 27
A limited number of significant cloud service providers exist. This is
typical of SIFMUs. Most SIFMUs – such as designated clearinghouses –
are essentially natural monopolies. 28 AWS captured about half of the
David Chou, Cloud Service Models (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) Diagram, DAVID CHOU BLOG
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://dachou.github.io/2018/09/28/cloud-service-models.html.
23 Banking Transformation, supra note 6, at 16.
24 Hoffman et al., supra note 1.
25 Matt VanderZwaag, The Financial Services Industry Looks to the Cloud, DATA CENTER
KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/industryperspectives/financial-services-industry-looks-cloud.
26 Treasury Report, supra note 6, at 49.
27 See id. at 50–51.
28 For additional information on clearinghouses, see Colleen Baker, Incomplete
Clearinghouse Mandates, 56 Am. Bus. L. J. 507–581 (2019).
22
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public cloud market in 2018, 29 followed by Microsoft Azure, and then
Google. Market share data for cloud service providers is difficult to
aggregate for two reasons: little information is available in public
disclosures, and any published data quickly becomes outdated. Although
determining the three providers’ exact share of the market is difficult,
estimates range from approximately 53-73%. 30 An inherent barrier to
market entry is the tremendous resources needed to compete in this area.
Hence, competition is limited. Substitutability is also limited should
problems arise at a provider. Such concerns have long plagued SIFMUs.
In sum, disruption at AWS or another significant cloud provider could
prove fatal to one or more banks or financial institutions and send
shockwaves throughout our financial system. Such entities are
undoubtedly a new source of risk in financial markets.
III. BENEFITS, COSTS, AND RISKS OF USING CLOUD SERVICES
A. Benefits
Cloud computing enables banks and financial institutions to nimbly
and rapidly respond to customer demands for customized products and
experiences. 31 Indeed, banking on the cloud has many benefits, including
this flexibility, potential for rapid innovation, reduced capital investment,
superior resource allocation, global presence, operational resiliency, and
heightened cybersecurity. Cloud resources are scalable to demand; banks
can use as much or as little of a provider’s resources as needed. On an
appropriate cloud infrastructure, the capacity available to a bank can be
effectively unlimited. From a business strategy perspective, updated
applications and platform transformations are significantly simpler on a
cloud system. This allows cloud-enabled businesses to respond more

Hoffman et al., supra note 1.
See AWS vs Azure vs IBM Cloud, Which Is the Best For Me?, NODERICKS
TECHNOLOGIES (Feb. 21, 2018), http://www.nodericks.com/aws-vs-azure-vs-googlevs-ibm-cloud-best/; Custom Applications and IaaS Trends CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE,
(2017), https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/assets/survey/custom-applicationsand-iaas-trends-2017.pdf.
31 See Institute of International Finance, Cloud Computing in the Financial Sector Part 1:
An Essential Enabler (2018). https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/private/32370132_
cloud_computing_in_the_financial_sector_20180803_0.pdf.
29
30

388

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

quickly to consumer demands and rapidly deliver new or updated products
to market. 32
The tremendous computing resources of cloud providers also increase
banks and financial institutions’ opportunities to fully leverage their data.
Data is one of today’s most valuable commodities. Cloud use not only
facilitates the collection and storage of massive amounts of data, but also
sophisticated and innovative analyses of this information. 33 Reams of data
can be analyzed and deployed by cutting-edge artificial intelligence,
machine learning and blockchain technologies that most banks’ and
financial institutions’ IT systems would be unable to support. 34
Use of cloud services also enables banks to reduce costs associated
with maintaining a complex, internal information technology
infrastructure requiring significant staff, maintenance, updates, and
provision for maximum potential resource use. Unlike most banks and
financial institutions, significant cloud providers have the tremendous
resources necessary to continuously invest in cutting-edge security
technologies. 35 Cybersecurity risk is likely the greatest potential cost banks
face. However, the overall security benefit to the financial system remains
unclear. Cloud computing might provide individual institutions a higher
level of security, but ultimately a lower level of security to the overall
system as the concentration of providers focuses the efforts of
cybersecurity attackers.
Currently, however, such cost savings are a secondary motivation
inducing banks and financial institutions to undertake the investment of
switching from enterprise to cloud computing. 36 Three factors are
ultimately of greater importance. First, cloud computing lowers barriers
See IBM INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS VALUE, Cloud For Financial Markets: Driving
Growth, Gaining Competitive Advantage and Improving Efficiency 2 (2015), https://ibm.com/
downloads/cas/KO5LM4DG.
33 Banking Transformation, supra note 6, at 17.
34 Id.
35 E.g., Philip Stafford, Cyber Threats Force US Clearing House on to Cloud, Fin. Times,
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/f61770b4-2784-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0
(quoting Jon Davidson, then COO of the Options Clearing Corporation, stating that
“Amazon is going to spend billions on information security for Amazon Web Services
this year.”
36 See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Mapping the Cloud Maturity Curve:
Measuring Organisational Excellence in the New Era of IT 8 n.d. (discussing a cloud maturity
curve. In an industry survey, banking and financial services executives listed the top three
impacts of cloud computing services to be: (1) improved data access, analysis and
utilization; (2) speedy delivery of new IT services and capabilities; and (3) improved
internal business process efficiency.).
32
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to entry and facilitates disruptive innovation by providing scaled resources
with minimal marginal cost. Second, the time-to-market advantage of
cloud computing allows organizations to quickly launch new products and
integrate newly acquired capabilities. Third, it facilitates greater
responsiveness to customers. Because cloud-enabled organizations benefit
from better infrastructure and computing platforms, applications can be
more quickly refined to meet rapidly shifting consumer demands. 37
B. Costs and Risks, Old and New
As a new technology, cloud computing has risks both known and
unknown. These unknown risks are the greatest potential cost of cloud
computing. Yet not migrating to the cloud and “being left behind” might
also be among an institution’s greatest risks in this context. 38 A top
concern of banks and financial institutions in using cloud services is
security. The recent hack of Capital One’s cloud-stored data validates this
worry. Costs of using cloud computing also include those associated with
transitioning from old IT systems, potential connectivity issues,
maintaining data confidentiality, the risk of provider lock-in, limited
leverage around pricing, and legal/regulatory risk domestically and
internationally. 39
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
views cloud computing as “another form of outsourcing with the same
basic risk characteristics and risk management requirements as traditional
forms of outsourcing.” 40 The FFIEC Information Technology
Examination Handbook for risk and risk management considerations is
applicable to the cloud services context. 41 Outsourcing to third-parties
creates legal, regulatory, business, and reputational risk for banks and
financial institutions. Hence, even if vendor relationships with cloud
service providers minimize certain costs for banks, they create others. For
example, as with traditional third-party outsourcing arrangements, when
contracting with a cloud service provider, banks must be concerned with

See id.
Institute of International Finance, Cloud Computing in the Financial Sector Part 1: An
Essential Enabler 7 (2018).
39 See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 6, at 50.
40 FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, OUTSOURCED
CLOUD COMPUTING 1 (2012).
41 See id.
37
38
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appropriate due diligence, vendor management, monitoring and auditing,
information security issues, operational resiliency, and disaster planning. 42
Proper due diligence requires understanding the service provider’s data
protection processes, the potential sharing among clients of cloud
network and server resources, the safeguarding of data privacy and
confidentiality, and the provision for disaster, recovery, and business
continuity. 43 Banks’ relationships with cloud service providers must
contractually address issues such as data ownership, storage and location,
accessibility, format, and protection as well as deletion once the vendor
relationship terminates. 44 The service provider should be familiar with
financial industry requirements related to the suitability of its internal
controls, which will eventually be audited for effective risk management,
and customers’ legal and regulatory compliance requirements. 45 Banks can
contractually require a cloud service provider to comply with relevant laws
and regulations, and attempt to ensure such compliance through
monitoring and audits. 46 Nevertheless, a bank’s board of directors and
senior management are ultimately responsible for ensuring that thirdparties to whom they outsource – such as cloud providers – meet legal and
regulatory requirements, in addition to operating in a safe and sound
manner. 47
Industry participants report that significant service providers such as
AWS, Google, and Microsoft Azure seem to be increasingly attuned to
banks’ regulatory environment, and “[t]here appears to have been a shift
from cloud providers to address regulators’ concerns over security, privacy
and financial services regulation – alongside a corresponding willingness
from regulators to work with cloud service providers on adoption
guidelines.” 48
Commentators have cautioned that banks and financial institutions
outsourcing relationships to traditional third-parties – a one to one
arrangement – are importantly distinct from their outsourcing
See id. at 2–4.
See id. at 2.
44 See id. at 3.
45 See id.
46 See BANKING TRANSFORMATION, supra note 6, at 187.
47 See FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 40,
42
43

at 2.

48 Andrew Reeves, Is a More Favourable Wind From Regulators Blowing Away Cloud
Concerns Among Banks?, TEMENOS (July 4, 2019), https://www.temenos.com/news/
2019/07/04/are-regulators-reducing-cloud-concerns/.
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arrangements to a cloud environment – a many to one arrangement. 49
Therefore, certain aspects of regulatory frameworks designed for the
traditional outsourcing arrangement will be inapposite. 50
Undoubtedly, however, cloud computing creates new risks. Cloud
service providers are single points of failure. Widespread use of cloud
computing introduces multiple sources of systemic risk to financial
markets, including their operational centrality to banks and financial
institutions, limited substitutability and the related problem of significant
service provider pricing leverage, potential market disruptions arising from
a crisis of public confidence, and the possibility of widespread data
integrity failures.
First, the operational centrality of computing services to banks and
financial institutions presents the clearest risk. For example, BoA is
migrating 80% of their technology workloads to virtual platforms,
utilizing computing infrastructure on the public cloud. 51 Given the
modern reality of highly interconnected and tightly coupled market
processes, any service disruption, such as a network connectivity
breakdown, cybersecurity breach, or data storage failure, will grind BoA’s
– or any other large bank’s – operations to a halt. This risk can be mitigated
somewhat by diversifying cloud service providers. Most financial
institutions do work with more than one cloud service provider. However,
the lion’s share of a firm’s cloud outsourcing will be with one primary
vendor – like Capital One with AWS.
The second source of systemic risk is the lack of cloud computing
provider substitutability, especially for the largest institutional clients. In
2017, the Office of Financial Research highlighted how a lack of
substitutability for services provided by a handful of firms (central banks,
custodian banks, and payment, clearing, settlement, and messaging
systems) creates systemic risks because a cyber incident at one of these
firms would disrupt the entire financial system. 52
Cloud service providers strategically offer products to maximize
customer lock-in. Software tools are built on top of cloud products,
49 See HAL S. SCOTT ET AL., CLOUD COMPUTING IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE, PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 30 (July 2019).
50 See id.
51 See Microsoft News Center, Bank of America Chooses the Microsoft Cloud to Support
Digital Transformation, MICROSOFT (Oct. 2, 2017) https://news.microsoft.com/2017/10/
02/bank-of-america-chooses-the-microsoft-cloud-to-support- digital- transformation/.
52 OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, CYBERSECURITY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY:
RISKS AND RELIANCE, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 3 (Feb. 15, 2017).
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creating immense switching costs. 53 As the financial institution’s customerfacing applications (also hosted on the cloud) develop in line with evolving
business strategies, entrenchment of the computing infrastructure and
other supporting services is enhanced. In addition, the advantages of
bundling all services with one provider are unavoidable. The complex
interplays of hardware, software, servers, and related processes are best
synced through a single cloud provider. This leaves financial firms
vulnerable to disruptions at their cloud provider. For example, in the case
of BoA, even a short-term disruption in its network connection with
Microsoft Azure would be highly problematic. And were network
problems to become more significant, BoA would not be able to
immediately and seamlessly switch to AWS.
The third source of systemic risk is the vulnerability of institutions to
a crisis of public confidence in this infrastructure. This concern relates to
multiple aspects of cloud computing such as transaction execution, data
storage and integrity, and customer interface reliability. A lack of
confidence that transactions are being executed efficiently in the cloud or
of data accuracy will diminish accurate price discovery for financial
products. Alternatively, a decline in public confidence in the security of
personally identifiable financial information shared with financial
institutions through products supported by cloud service providers will at
best decrease consumer interaction with the financial industry and, at
worst, create the computing version of a depression-era bank run in the
future.
Data integrity is a fourth source of systemic risk. Financial markets
require public confidence which cannot be secured without data integrity.
The offsite and shared nature of cloud service environments, particularly
multi-tenant community or public cloud models, heightens the risk that
the underlying data on which financial institutions rely is vulnerable to loss
or manipulation. Additionally, many financial market activities occur on a
just-in-time basis, raising the stakes of data integrity because of the
difficulty of unwinding and rewinding executed transactions. 54 When
multiple clients share a common server, significant security technology is
deployed to partition the cloud and create secure areas of access for each
53 See Eugene Kim, Amazon’s Cloud Sitting on at Least $12.4 Billion of Future Revenue,
CNBC (May 9, 2018) (highlighting the observation of Tom Roderick, an analyst at Stifel
Nicalous, that AWS’s impressive current and projected financial performance results
partly from the sticky nature of their service for enterprise clients).
54 See OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 52, at 3–4.
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client that eliminates the risk of each contaminating the other’s data
facilities. Many current cloud service and cybersecurity regulatory
guidelines encourage a variety of data backup processes. Still, tradeoffs
exist between rapid data recovery after a crisis and confidence in the
completeness, accuracy, and safety of the restored dataset. 55
The fifth factor contributing to systemic risk is the supplier power
wielded by a few dominant cloud service providers. For example, should
cloud-service providers disengage from smaller, less lucrative, financial
institutions, a large part of the financial system would be vulnerable. 56 In
most cloud consumer-provider relationships, data centers; networking;
data storage processes; servers; and virtualization occur under the control
of the service provider. 57 This creates a risk that customers may not have
the appropriate controls to ensure provider-managed components of the
cloud service consistently conform to regulatory requirements. However,
as noted above, industry participants view provider appreciation of the
regulatory environment in which they operate as increasing.
IV. LEGAL AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS
Cloud computing is inherently global. Computing resources and
customers inhabit multiple jurisdictions. In general, banking regulators
across the globe are charged with maintaining the safety and soundness of
regulated institutions and the stability of the financial system. Yet even
with this shared objective, they operate in distinct regulatory
environments. Indeed, no “single authority for cloud law” 58 exists - not
even on a domestic basis in the United States! 59 Ideally, global
policymakers would take a coordinated approach to cloud computing. In
the meantime, however, international regulatory differences will increase
the risks and costs accompanying cloud computing. Global banks and
financial institutions will need to wrestle with the regulatory requirements
of diverse international regimes in their use of such services. Fortunately,
global banks and financial institutions are already familiar with the
55
56

at 3.

See id. at 4.
See FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 40,

Fratto, supra note 13 (citing OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, supra note 52, at 4).
See Reeves, supra note 48.
59 BANK OF ENGLAND FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 49 (July 2019), https://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2019/july-2019.pdf
(projected that both the United Kingdom’s Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial
Policy Committee will release cloud computing publications by the end of 2019).
57
58
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navigation of such issues. Many financial markets are inherently global.
Regulation, however, occurs on a national level (and will for the
foreseeable future).
In the U.S., the most directly applicable regulatory guidance for
outsourced cloud computing services in the financial sector is outlined in
the Federal Reserve’s SR Letter 13-19: “Guidance on Managing
Outsourcing Risk.” 60 This guidance details supervisory expectations for
appropriate service provider risk management programs. In 2018, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta published an article that highlights how
the SR Letter 13-19 specifically applies to cloud service providers. When
it comes to examining the relationship between regulated financial
institutions and cloud service providers, the article notes that supervisors
will focus on contracts, controls, cybersecurity, disaster recovery, and
sound practices. It emphasizes that a bank’s risk management program
should involve scrutiny “commensurate with the level of risk presented
by the outsourcing arrangements.” 61
An important regulatory consideration in the U.S. – and likely also
present in other countries – is the need for modernization of legal and
regulatory frameworks. Some aspects of traditional regulatory structures
for banks and financial institutions are simply inapplicable to cloud
environments. One example of this problem would be outdated record
keeping rules requiring access to an institution’s physical premises to
conduct physical audits. 62 Similarly, regulatory requirements addressing
cybersecurity, data protection, and bank outsourcing must be appropriate
to a cloud context. 63 A 2015 survey of financial services firms found that
“regulatory restrictions” and “data security concerns” were key reasons
behind their cautious approach to cloud usage. 64 Additional regulatory
hindrances exist. They include inconsistent expectations or unclear
guidance by regulators, the administrative costs associated with securing
such guidance from multiple regulators, a lack of technical knowledge and
experience by traditional bank examiners to adequately monitor the risks

See FED. RES. SYS., GUIDANCE ON MANAGING OUTSOURCING RISK (Dec. 5, 2013).
Id. at 2 (stating “[i]t should focus on outsourced activities that have a substantial
impact on a financial institution’s financial condition; are critical to the institution’s
ongoing operations; involve sensitive customer information or new bank products or
services; or pose material compliance risk.”).
62 Banking Transformation, supra note 6, at 6.
63 Id. at 18.
64 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 6, at 50.
60
61

2020]

BANKING ON THE CLOUD

395

associated with cloud adoption, and certain incompatibilities of traditional
legal and regulatory frameworks with cloud services use. 65
Traditional legal and regulatory frameworks must modernize to track
technological developments. Indeed, a 2018 report by the U.S. Treasury
recognizes cloud computing as a key technology, facilitating innovation
and the competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions. 66 Accordingly, it
recommends that “federal financial regulators modernize their
requirements and guidance (e.g., vendor oversight) to better provide for
appropriate adoption of new technologies such as cloud computing, with
the aim of reducing unnecessary barriers to the prudent and informed
migration of activities to the cloud.” 67 It offers a number of specific
recommendations 68 and suggests a related working group of financial
regulators be formed. 69
To facilitate banks’ adoption of cloud services, commentators have
urged international regulatory coordination and a community-based
approach to cloud audits. 70 Alternatives to traditional onsite audits for
cloud service providers could also include use of third-party certifications
or audit reports, or even the internal audit reports of cloud service
providers themselves. 71
Additionally, cloud service providers also outsource to third parties
who, in turn, use cloud computing. This creates potential “chain
outsourcing” issues, 72 which should be addressed by regulators.
Finally, financial regulators and government agencies are customers of
cloud service providers. 73 As a result, a major disruption or failure of a
See id.
Id. at 52.
67 Id.
68 Id. (discussing recommendations including “formally recognizing independent U.S.
audit and security standards that sufficiently meet regulatory expectations; addressing
outdated record keeping rules like SEC Rule 17a-4; clarifying how audit requirements
may be met; setting clear and appropriately tailored expectations for chain outsourcing;
and providing staff examiners appropriate training to implement agency policy on cloud
services.”).
69 Id.
70 SCOTT, supra note 49, at 2.
71 Banking Transformation, supra note 6, at 22.
72 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 6, at 51.; Banking Transformation, supra note 7, at 21
(noting”[i]n Europe, the EBA’s cloud outsourcing recommendations mandate that banks
must not only ensure that their CSPs fulfil all regulatory requirements, but that any
subcontractors of those CSPs do also. Access and audit rights therefore have to be
cascaded down in a CSP chain to any subcontractor – which could include a significant
number of entities.”).
73 See Stafford, supra note 35, at 1.
65
66
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cloud provider could be even more consequential than that of most
private financial institutions. What would happen if a cloud service
provider’s operational or security issues impacted a financial regulatory
agency’s ability to make critical decisions surrounding the distress or failure
of a significant financial institution or FMU? Such new and potential risks
strongly suggest that these entities might eventually be among the most
consequential FMUs.
In sum, even before the Capital One data breach, it was clear that
existing regulations governing banks and financial institutions’ use of the
cloud were inadequate. Cloud computing is a new source of systemic risk,
and it should be recognized as such. To this end, the next Part argues that
significant cloud service providers should be designated SIFMUs under
Title VIII.
V. CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDERS: THE NEW SIFMUS?
Cloud service providers are increasingly critical to the infrastructure
of financial markets and, therefore, becoming core FMUs. Indeed, the
Bank of England’s 2019 Financial Stability Report 74 discusses cloud
computing in a section entitled “Developments in Financial Market
Infrastructure.” In its 2018 Annual Report, the FSOC noted that
“[m]aintaining confidence in the security practices of third-party service
providers has become increasingly important, particularly because
different financial institutions are often serviced by the same providers.” 75
In an implicit acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the existing
regulatory framework governing cloud services, the FSOC recommended
that “Congress pass legislation that ensures that the federal banking
agencies, FHFA, and NCUA have adequate examination and enforcement
powers to oversee third-party service providers.” 76 Designating significant
cloud providers as SIFMUs would acknowledge these realties.
Additionally, it would require that such entities be highly resilient, have
governance and risk management standards congruent with their critical
infrastructure role, and prioritize the managing of risk over commercial
interests. 77
The usage of cloud services by banks and financial institutions is likely
only to increase. Hence, the risk these providers pose to financial market
BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 10, at 44–48.
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2019).
76 Id. at 8.
77 BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 10, at 48.
74
75
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stability will likewise only escalate. As a single point of failure, a significant
cloud service provider’s operational disruption would compromise the
functioning of firms throughout the economy, including banking and
financial institutions. This reality is surely one explanation behind the
Federal Reserve examiners’ spring 2019 Amazon facility visit. For such
reasons, significant cloud service providers should be designated SIFMUs
under Dodd-Frank’s Title VIII.
A. Title VIII in General
Title VIII, entitled Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Activities, is short (a
mere 20 pages) but packs a regulatory punch. Its overarching purpose is
to “mitigate systemic risk in the financial system and promote financial
stability.” 78 Towards this objective, it provides the Federal Reserve with
authority to promote uniform standards of risk management and conduct
for designated SIFMUs and also increased authority to supervise them.
In general, a FMU would be designated as systemically important
under Title VIII by the FSOC after a notice and comment period.
However, emergency designations are possible. In July 2012, the FSOC
designated eight FMUs, five being clearinghouses. 79
B. Designating Significant Cloud Service Providers Under Title VIII
Dodd-Frank defines a financial market utility to be “any person that
manages or operates a multilateral system for the purpose of transferring,
clearing, or settling payments, securities, or other financial transactions
among financial institutions or between financial institutions and the
person.” 80 Undoubtedly, cloud service providers operate multilateral
systems. Additionally, their services foundationally enable the transactions
undertaken both by other financial institutions and by FMUs such as the
Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) already designated as systemically
important under Title VIII. The OCC has announced “plans to move its
operations into cloud computing” 81 and that part of its risk management

78 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111203, § 802(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780).
79 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Designated Financial
Market Utilities (2012) https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_
fmu_about.htm.
80 Id. at § 803(6)(A).
81 Stafford, supra note 35 (noting that other exchanges are also migrating parts of
their systems to cloud computing).
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platform will operate in a cloud environment. 82 Any disruptions in
arrangements such as this would create the ultimate chain outsourcing
issue. 83
“Payment, clearing, or settlement activity” is expansively defined to be
“an activity carried out by 1 or more financial institutions to facilitate the
completion of financial transaction.” 84 Title VIII further defines “financial
transaction” to include a number of different types of financial contracts
such as funds transfers, swaps, securities, forwards, repurchase
agreements, and “any similar transaction that the Council [FSOC]
determines to be a financial transaction for purposes of this title.” 85
Additionally, it states that “[w]hen conducted with respect to a financial
transaction, payment, clearing, and settlement activities may include” 86 a
number of activities such as “the calculation and communication of
unsettled financial transactions between counterparties,” 87 “the movement
of funds,” 88 and “other similar functions that the Council [FSOC] may
determine.” 89 Given its breadth, cloud service providers certainly fall
within Title VIII’s definition of a FMU. At a minimum, cloud service
providers are multilateral systems whose computing resources are used by
financial institutions and FMUs to transfer funds among themselves.
Many of Title VIII’s definitions, such as for “financial market utility,”
“financial institutions,” and “payment, clearing and settlement activity,” do
include exclusions. For example, trading exchanges are generally excluded
from the definition of “financial market utility.” However, even these
exclusions have exclusions. An example of this occurs in the definition of
“financial market utility” regarding entities that would generally be
excluded from the definition but are not excluded because they perform
“critical risk management or processing functions of the financial market
utility.” 90 One of the authors has argued that such exclusions within
82 OCC Launches Renaissance Initiative to Modernize Technology Infrastructure, OPTIONS
CLEARING CORP. (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.theocc.com/about/newsroom/releases/
2019/january-14-occ-launches-renaissance-initiative-to-modernize-technology-structure.jsp.
83 This is because banks and financial institutions are outsourcing derivatives risk to
clearinghouses such as the Options Clearing Corporation, who in turn are now
outsourcing aspects of their operations and risk management to cloud service providers.
84 Dodd-Frank, supra note 78 at, § 803(7)(A).
85 Id. at § 802(7)(B).
86 Id. at § 802(7)(C).
87 Id. at § 803(7)(C)(i).
88 Id. at § 803(7)(C)(vi).
89 Id. at § 803(7)(C)(viii).
90 Id. at § 803(6)(B)(ii).
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exclusions allow for a highly expansive interpretation of which entities
ultimately fall within Title VIII’s definition of “financial market utility.” 91
Hence, although such exclusions do exist, they should not prevent a cloud
service provider from falling within Title VIII’s definition of “financial
market utility.” 92
As with the existing SIFMUs, a disruptive event at a significant cloud
service provider would propagate throughout the financial system, causing
widespread harm. Title VIII proscribes five factors for the FSOC to
evaluate when considering the systemic significance or potential systemic
significance of an FMU: (1) the overall monetary amount of the
transactions processed by the FMU; (2) the aggregate exposure of the
FMU to counterparties; (3) the relationship, interdependencies, or other
interactions with other FMUs or payment, clearing, or settlement
activities; (4) the effect the FMU’s failure would have on critical markets,
financial institutions, or the broader financial system; and (5) “any other
factors that the Council [FSOC] deems appropriate.” 93 By enabling
transaction processing and providing network linkages between financial
institutions, significant cloud service providers satisfy each of the first four
factors. Additionally, the fifth factor provides the FSOC virtually limitless
latitude to consider other factors for which there is a reasonable basis for
their consideration. Given the expansiveness of this fifth factor, there
should be no difficulties were the FSOC to find that significant cloud
providers are systemically important now and will only become more so
in the future.
C. The Impact of Title VIII Designation for Cloud Providers
Being designated a SIFMU would have significant implications for a
cloud service provider, particularly in the areas of governance, risk
management, and recovery planning. 94 A SIFMU designation would apply
to the legal entity providing cloud services. Thus, AWS, a subsidiary of
See Baker, supra note 12, at 105.
Additionally, in forthcoming research, one of the authors argues that DoddFrank’s conception of systemic risk is too narrow and, therefore, Title VIII should be
expanded to generally include entities such as trading exchanges within the definition of
financial market utility because of their systemic significance. Colleen M. Baker, The
Exchange As Systemic Risk Regulator (working title).
93 Dodd-Frank., supra note 78, at § 804(a)(2)(A)-(E).
94 See Dan Ryan, Financial Market Utilities: Is the System Safer?, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 21, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/02/21/
financial-market-utilities-is-the-system-safer/.
91
92
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Amazon, would receive the SIFMU designation, not the parent company
Amazon.
Designating AWS, or another cloud service provider, as a SIFMU
would require an overhaul of existing corporate governance arrangements,
including ensuring the inclusion of independent directors on its board of
directors. In some cases, it might actually require that a board be created.
For example, AWS currently has its own CEO, but not a board. The
SIFMU cloud provider’s “board, senior management, risk managers, and
internal audit” 95 would be under enhanced regulatory scrutiny, a
tremendous change from the status quo. Its regulator, presumably the
Federal Reserve, 96 would evaluate the substantive qualifications of board
members to oversee a cloud computing business, and examine
management’s execution of business strategy and risk management in
accord with the board’s policies. 97
A SIFMU designation would also require that cloud service providers
establish a Chief Risk Officer position and publish a comprehensive risk
management framework. 98 This risk management framework would look
very different from the risk management frameworks of current SIFMUs,
which are primarily focused on credit and liquidity risks. While these risks
are still applicable to cloud service providers, the most relevant risk is
operational. The risk management frameworks for designated cloud
service providers should emphasize business continuity under a variety of
circumstances, including natural disasters and cyber-attacks.
Finally, designated cloud service providers will have to file periodic
recovery and wind-down plans with their regulator(s). 99 For current
SIFMUs, these plans primarily focus on withstanding one or more
member defaults. Cloud service providers have a different business model
– current SIFMUs are generally member-owned or part of publicly-traded
exchange structures. Therefore, their recovery plans can be expected to
focus less on the possibility of financial difficulty at one or more of their
customers, and more on how they will continue to serve their customers
in the event of a financial or operational disruption.
Id.
Id. (The Federal Reserve is the backup regulator for SIFMUs whose primary
regulator is the Securities Exchange Commission or the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission. Otherwise, it is the SIFMU’s primary regulator).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
95
96
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CONCLUSION
Cloud service providers are fast becoming critical aspects of financial
market infrastructure. Their importance, in addition to banks’ and
financial institutions’ reliance on them, will only grow. Hence, cloud
computing will increasingly be in the regulatory spotlight, and counted
among the most significant risks to financial market stability. Currently, no
financial regulatory agency has direct supervisory authority over cloud
service providers. This must change. To this end, this article argues that
significant cloud service providers as critical financial market
infrastructure should be designated by the FSOC as SIFMUs.

